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Beyond Paternalism:  Rethinking the  
Limits of Public Health Law 
WENDY E. PARMET 
This response to David Friedman’s Public Health Regulation and the 
Limits of Paternalism challenges his claim that the rejection of paternalism 
creates a “limit” on public health law’s potential for addressing the 
obesity epidemic and offers a defense of public health laws as exercises of 
self-governance.  The Article begins by showing why many of the laws that 
Friedman classifies as paternalistic are not actually paternalistic.  Nor are 
most public health laws as unpopular as Friedman presumes.  Moreover, 
the public’s disapproval of some public health laws may be due to factors 
other than their paternalism, including their origination at times by out-of-
touch public health agencies.  Public health laws, the Article argues, can 
be justified as an exercise of self-governance; they should be the laws that 
populations enact to protect their own health.  When officials act without 
regard to that popular foundation, as the New York City Board of Health 
did in banning the sale of large portions of sugary soda, a backlash may 
follow whether or not the law is paternalistic.  Thus policymakers should 
worry less about whether a proposed law is paternalistic and more about 
whether it is responsive to the needs and concerns of the population it 
seeks to protect. 
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Beyond Paternalism:  Rethinking the  
Limits of Public Health Law 
WENDY E. PARMET* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“[P]aternalism,” David Friedman writes in his illuminating article, 
“may have reached natural limits of effectiveness,” especially with respect 
to public health.1  Given the public’s disdain for paternalism, Friedman 
argues that paternalistic public health policies, particularly those 
embodying hard paternalism, are destined to fail, as did New York City’s 
ban on the sale of large sugary sodas.2  This rejection of paternalism, 
Friedman argues, is deeply problematic for public health.3  As Friedman 
sees it, many of the most critical public health problems of our times, 
especially obesity, can be addressed only by implementing paternalistic, 
including hard paternalistic, policies.4 
                                                                                                                          
* Matthews University Distinguished Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.   
I wish to thank Julian Canzoneri and Caitlin Perry for their outstanding research assistance and Peter 
Jacobson for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.  All errors are my own. 
1 David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. 
REV. 1687, 1693 (2014).  Friedman’s use of the word “natural” is intriguing.  As will be discussed, I 
question whether the limits that public health is facing are based on paternalism.  Even if they are, there 
is no reason to believe that the limits are “natural” and not contingent on the social and political culture 
of contemporary American society.  See infra Part III.   
2 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1769; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 690 (2014) (finding that the 
Board of Health lacked authority to ban the sale of large sugary sodas).   
3 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1765 (explaining that the rejection of paternalism will hurt “the 
future use of regulatory tools” to combat public health problems such as obesity).  Friedman is hardly 
alone in seeing debates about paternalism as central to arguments about the appropriateness of public 
health interventions.  See, e.g., L.O. Gostin & K.G. Gostin, A Broader Liberty: J.S. Mill, Paternalism 
and the Public’s Health, 123 PUB. HEALTH 214, 215 (2009) (arguing that the “political community 
should at least be open to the idea of paternalism to prevent or ameliorate harms in the population”); 
Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny?: Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of 
Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 88 (Supp. 2013) (noting that arguments about 
paternalism “have cultural and political resonance”).  Indeed, leading critics of the so-called “new 
public health” have assailed it at least in part for being paternalistic.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, 
What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1364 (2005) 
(presenting an argument against government intervention); Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of 
Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S208 (Supp. 2003) (“[P]ublic health 
advocates seriously overstep their bounds when they call on government to address broad economic 
and political conditions as public health problems . . . .”). 
4 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1719 (“The only real way to solve the obesity problem in the 
United States . . . would be to press forward with solutions on every dimension of the problem.”). 
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In the face of this dilemma, Friedman seeks to provide policymakers 
with a guide for the effective use of paternalistic public health 
interventions.  Drawing heavily on the insights of behavioral economics 
and the work of Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein,5 Friedman presents a 
spectrum of what he describes as five increasingly “hard” levels of 
intervention, ranging from those that are apaternalistic (and rely on the 
market), to debiasing strategies, insulating strategies (including subsidies 
and taxes), and the most “hard” form of paternalism, bans or mandates.6  
With great detail, Friedman explores different types of strategies that can 
be used to combat obesity within each of the levels on his spectrum.  He 
also provides keen insights from the reaction to, and success or failure of, 
different regulatory tools in the areas of fluoridation, marijuana, and the 
regulation of genetically-modified foods or genetically-modified organisms 
(GMOs).7  In so doing, Friedman exposes the thick particularity of public 
health policymaking.  For example, while he suggests that “softer” 
interventions are generally less likely to raise the public’s ire, even calls 
for voluntarism have provoked a backlash in some circumstances.8  In 
other cases, such as with trans fats, outright bans have encountered little 
resistance.9  The devil, it seems, does lie in the details through which 
Friedman guides us. 
Despite the context-laden nature of his analysis, Friedman draws some 
important general conclusions.  One is that “[i]f regulators minimize the 
perception that they are reducing autonomy,” its restriction might prove 
more palatable.10  A second is that “if regulators examine the entire 
spectrum of options . . . they may identify a mix of initiatives that combine 
efficacy with practicality.”11  Or to put it another way, paternalism may yet 
be an effective public health tool as long as policymakers proceed with 
knowledge, caution, humility, and maybe even a little guile. 
Friedman’s analysis of public health interventions is rich and nuanced, 
providing valuable reading for public health policymakers.  Nevertheless, 
Friedman’s premise that paternalism, particularly hard paternalism, has 
reached its limits warrants fuller examination.  Can we be sure that 
paternalism qua paternalism has reached its limits, or is the recent outcry 
against New York City’s portion cap rule and other public health measures 
recounted by Friedman due in large or small measure to factors other than 
a rejection of paternalism, especially in its hard form?  Knowing the 
                                                                                                                          
5 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006). 
6 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698–99.  
7 Id. Part III.C.  
8 See id. at 1723–26 (explaining that even a small level of government intervention can result in 
harsh public criticism, as evidenced by the “Let’s Move!” effort). 
9 Id. at 1709.  
10 Id. at 1769.  
11 Id. at 1770.   
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answer to that question may be as important to the future of public health 
policymaking as knowing the specific features of the various regulatory 
interventions that Friedman discusses.  
In this Article, I explore this question, revisiting Friedman’s 
assumptions about the role that paternalism plays in debates about public 
health law.  My conclusions are tentative, but perhaps surprising: while 
paternalism may be highly unpopular at this moment in the American 
polity, it is neither as critical for public health protection nor as central to 
the backlash against legal interventions as Friedman presumes.12  Public 
health law is facing extraordinary challenges, but to respond to them we 
need to both better understand, and move beyond, the paternalism debate. 
I begin in Part II by reviewing what is meant by paternalism, as well as 
the concepts of hard and soft paternalism.  This discussion leads me to 
argue that many public health interventions should not be understood as 
exercises of paternalism.  In Part III, I problematize Friedman’s assertion 
that paternalism has met its limits, suggesting instead a variety of other 
ways to view public health laws as well as the criticism they face.  In 
Part IV, I offer a different defense of public health laws, one grounded less 
on an acceptance of paternalism than on the recognition of the liberty to 
self-govern.  This defense, I suggest, provides a different perspective on 
the “nanny state” critique of public health laws; it also offers some 
cautions about the value of guiding policymakers on the smart use of 
paternalism. 
II.  THE PARAMETERS OF PATERNALISM 
There is no question that public health law has recently been playing 
defense.13  Over the last several years, court decisions concerning 
                                                                                                                          
12 Like Friedman, I do not discuss here the ethics of public health paternalism, an issue that has 
been much mooted.  See, e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE 
PATERNALISM (2013) (providing an ethical defense of the use of paternalism); Ronald Bayer & Amy L. 
Fairchild, The Genesis of Public Health Ethics, 18 BIOETHICS 473, 485–92 (2004) (arguing that public 
health ethics, as opposed to bioethics, may provide greater space for paternalism); David R. Buchanan, 
Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice: Ethical Priorities in Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15, 
16–17 (2008) (questioning the ethics of using paternalism in public health); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas 
Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 685, 687 (2009) (arguing that soft paternalism is dangerous because of its inherent susceptibility 
to slippery slopes).  I also do not consider, except in passing, the role that paternalism or debates over it 
have played in recent court decisions rejecting public health interventions.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 108–09.  It is worth noting that when Friedman argues that paternalism has met its 
limits, he seems to be referring to political rather than legal limits.  For a discussion of the possible role 
that the discourse surrounding paternalism played in the United States Supreme Court’s decision over 
the Affordable Care Act, see Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentified: The Potential of Public 
Health Law, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 255, 272–77 (2013). 
13 Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health: Caught in a Pincer 
Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 392 (2014). 
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commercial speech, preemption, the scope of congressional authority, and 
the status of public health evidence—among other topics—have eroded the 
doctrinal foundations upon which many public health laws rest.14  At the 
same time, the political and social climate has appeared increasingly 
hostile to the use of law to promote the public’s health, at least with respect 
to obesity.15  As Friedman shows so well, the efforts by former New York 
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg to address the obesity epidemic sparked a 
wave of ridicule and outrage, epitomized by the term “Nanny 
Bloomberg.”16  Numerous other proposed public health laws, from soda 
taxes to gun control measures, have met political dead-ends.17  And even 
well-established public health legal interventions, such as vaccination laws, 
have faced renewed resistance.18  
But does this mean that paternalism, especially so-called hard 
paternalism, has met its natural limits, as Friedman suggests?  To answer 
that question, several prior questions need to be addressed, including: what 
is meant by the “limits” of law; what is meant by paternalism; and under 
what conditions are public health laws paternalistic?  We also need to 
know whether the disapproval of public health laws that exists stems from 
a rejection of paternalism or from some other factors.  Likewise, to decide 
whether hard paternalism is less palatable than soft paternalism, we need to 
identify the factors that distinguish hard from soft paternalism and consider 
                                                                                                                          
14 Id. at 393–94.  
15 The magnitude of the popular backlash may be overstated.  While there is no doubt that several 
recent public health efforts regarding obesity have been met with resistance, if not scorn, many public 
health measures remain quite popular with the public, if not the courts.  Compare Friedman, supra note 
1, at 1719  (discussing “political resistance to paternalistic endeavors”), with Scott Burris & Evan 
Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public Health Law 
Research, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 95, 106–07 (2013) (arguing that legal intervention on behalf of 
public health is popular and that the central problem may be judicial, not popular resistance), and 
Stephanie Morain & Michelle M. Mello, Survey Finds Public Support for Legal Interventions Directed 
at Health Behavior to Fight Noncommunicable Disease, 32 HEALTH AFF. 486, 490–93 (2013) 
(presenting the results of a national survey that shows support for government intervention directed at 
health behavior that addresses noncommunicable diseases).  For further discussion of this issue, see 
infra text accompanying notes 74–80.  
16 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1689.  For a defense of Bloomberg’s actions, see Lawrence O. 
Gostin, Bloomberg’s Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny?, 43 HASTINGS CENTER 
RPT. 19, 19–24 (2013).   
17 See Josh Blackman & Shelby Baird, The Shooting Cycle, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1513, Part VI.B–E 
(2014) (describing the rise and fall of public support for federal gun control legislation in the wake of 
the Newtown tragedy); Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an Antitax 
Message, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010, at A14 (discussing New York State’s failed soda tax). 
18 See Phillips v. City of New York, Nos. 12-CV-237 (WFK)(LB), 13-CV-791 (WFK)(LB), 2014 
WL 2547584 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (rejecting a challenge to the New York City practice of barring 
unvaccinated children from attending school during outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases); Saad 
B. Omer et al., Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable 
Diseases, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2009) (noting that “increasing numbers of parents” are 
refusing or delaying vaccination for their children). 
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how those specific factors affect a law’s legal or political reception.  
Unfortunately, although Friedman provides a valuable analysis of the 
strengths and pitfalls of various public health legal interventions, his 
analysis of these questions is at times insufficient and at other times 
inconsistent.  
Consider first what Friedman means by the “limits” to paternalism.  
Although public health laws have faced some notable defeats in the courts 
in recent years,19 these decisions have not, for the most part, relied on the 
paternalistic nature of the laws at issue.20  Nor does Friedman rely on legal 
doctrine to demonstrate paternalism’s limits; indeed, many of the examples 
he gives of failed paternalistic interventions concern laws that were never 
before a court.21  Instead, when Friedman discusses the limits of 
paternalism, he seems to be referring to paternalism’s political, rather than 
legal limits.  He is making, in effect, the important claim that the public is 
unwilling to accept, or is at least uncomfortable with, certain paternalistic 
laws.  For reasons I make clear in Part IV, Friedman’s recognition that 
public health laws may be limited by public sentiment is an important one.  
However, although public sentiment undoubtedly influences the 
development of judicial doctrine, it is vital to recognize that political limits 
are distinct from legal ones. 
As for the meaning of “paternalism,” Friedman borrows from Gerald 
Dworkin, who defines “paternalism” as the “interference with a person’s 
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, 
good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.”22  
This definition is similar to others common in the literature.  For example, 
in her recent defense of paternalism, Sara Conly relies on John Kleinig’s 
definition that paternalism exists when “X acts to diminish Y’s freedom, to 
the end that Y’s good may be secured.”23  Likewise, Thaddeus Mason Pope 
states that paternalism is the “restriction of a subject’s self-regarding 
                                                                                                                          
19 See Parmet & Jacobson, supra note 13, at 392 (discussing the enjoining of New York City’s 
ban on large sugary sodas and the defeat of FDA regulations requiring graphic warning labels on 
cigarette packages).  
20 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking 
down an FDA regulation requiring graphic warning labels on cigarettes as violating First Amendment 
protections for commercial speech), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 
F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 690 (2014) (striking down New York City’s soda 
portion cap rule as being outside the Board of Health’s regulatory authority).  For further discussion of 
the New York Court of Appeals’ rejection of the portion cap rule, see infra notes 108–09. 
21 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1732–33  (discussing a Mississippi statute prohibiting 
localities from requiring fast-food establishments from posting calories). 
22 Id. at 1695 (quoting Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64, 65 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although paternalism requires the restriction of liberty, it may also enhance 
liberty.  See infra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
23 CONLY, supra note 12, at 17 (quoting JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 18 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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conduct primarily for the good of the same subject.”24 
Under each of these definitions, paternalistic laws are distinguished 
from other laws in that they regulate self-regarding rather than other-
regarding behavior.25  Moreover, they regulate behavior in order to benefit 
the individual whose behavior is in question.  Thus a law that limits the 
liberty of one person X in order to benefit another Y is not rightly speaking 
paternalistic, even if it seeks to benefit Y by influencing Y’s self-regarding 
behavior.  For example, a law compelling a tobacco company (X) to 
include a warning label on its advertisements is not actually paternalistic 
because the party intended to be benefitted (Y, the would-be smoker) is not 
the person whose liberty is limited.26  Put differently, the activity that is 
regulated, tobacco marketing, is not a self-regarding behavior; like all 
advertising, it is very much directed to others.  Similarly, a law that limits 
the liberty of a subject in order to benefit someone else is not ordinarily 
thought of as paternalistic even if the law has the incidental effect of 
benefiting the subject whose liberty is limited.  For example, we would not 
say that laws limiting speeding are paternalistic even though they may also 
benefit the health of the drivers whose liberty is restricted.27  Rather, we 
                                                                                                                          
24 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard 
Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2004). 
25 Of course, to paternalism’s critics, it is this focus on regulating an individual’s behavior that 
affects only that individual that is problematic.  See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART 
MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS 97 (John M. Robson ed., 1966) (“[W]hen the person’s conduct 
affects the interests of no persons besides himself . . . there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, 
to do the action and stand the consequences.”).  
26 Cass Sunstein offers a different reason why such a law is not paternalistic.  He writes that 
“disclosure of truthful information is not ordinarily understood as paternalistic . . . [because] disclosure 
requirements are meant to inform, not to displace, people’s understanding of which choices will 
promote their welfare.”  Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and 
Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1865–66 (2013); see also Stephen A. McGuinness, Time to Cut the 
Fat: The Case for Government Anti-Obesity Legislation, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 41, 54 (2012) (arguing that 
disclosure laws are not paternalistic because they do not limit liberty).  Thaddeus Mason Pope, in 
contrast, contends that such laws are an example of so-called “indirect paternalism,” in that they try to 
dissuade the individual from harms without the individual’s consent to dissuasion.  Pope, supra note 
24, at 687.  This conclusion, however, eviscerates the distinction between the harm principle and 
paternalism.  All laws that limit the conduct of X to benefit Y can be criticized on the claim that we do 
not know a priori whether Y would consent to limiting X’s liberty.  For example, a law preventing X 
from selling spoiled food would generally be thought of as one permitted by the harm principle.  But 
like the smoking ban, it can be claimed that the purchasers of the unwholesome food have not 
consented to the law.  Likewise a law prohibiting X from stabbing Y might be claimed (ludicrously) as 
paternalistic in that it prevents X from harming Y even though Y might prefer to defend herself (perhaps 
she thinks her honor is better maintained if she relies on self-defense rather than the law to protect her).  
In both cases, the law should not be viewed as paternalistic because the goal is to prevent X from 
harming Y.  As Pope notes, quoting Dennis Thompson, “paternalism refers not to a distinct class of 
actions but [refers instead] to a class of reasons that we may use [or may be used] to justify or 
condemn restrictions.”  Id. at 694 (first alteration in original) (quoting DENNIS F. THOMPSON, 
POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE 153 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
27 Sunstein notes that paternalism “does not include government efforts to prevent people from 
harming others.”  Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1863. 
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recognize that the benefits that accrue to drivers who are stopped from 
speeding are secondary to the benefits that accrue to others who are 
protected from would-be speeders. 
Of course, it is always problematic to evaluate laws by their “goals.”28  
Laws—including regulations promulgated by administrative agencies—are 
the product of many actors who may be motivated by multiple conflicting 
or indeterminate goals.  As a result, the task of determining whether a law 
is paternalistic, i.e., whether it seeks the good of the subject whose liberty 
is restricted, is invariably fraught with uncertainty.  Some policymakers 
may want to limit indoor smoking to protect the smoker; others may want 
to reduce the risk faced by non-smokers.  In such a case, there may be no 
real way of knowing for certain whether a law is properly categorized as 
paternalistic. 
Yet, even if we can put the problem of determining a law’s motivation 
to one side, there are reasons to question Friedman’s assumptions about the 
paternalistic nature of some public health interventions.  For example, 
while Friedman posits a spectrum of paternalistic laws and policies 
applicable to public health, he seems to accept that almost all public health 
interventions that go beyond voluntarism or reliance on the unregulated 
market are in fact paternalistic.  He thus categorizes “efforts to improve 
decision making by stringing data together into truthful narratives of harm” 
as a form of paternalism that he calls “strong-form debiasing.”29  But are 
such interventions—if we can even call them such— paternalistic? 
Consider the example Friedman offers, Morgan Spurlock’s movie, 
Super Size Me, a powerful documentary film that uses narrative to critique 
and condemn the fast food industry.30  Even if we accept that Spurlock 
created the film in order to influence viewers’ consumption of fast food 
(and Friedman does not give us any insight as to Spurlock’s motive),31 the 
film still would not be paternalistic because it does not in any way limit the 
                                                                                                                          
28 For that reason alone, it is problematic to conclude that some laws are unjustifiable simply on 
the grounds that they are paternalistic.  Take for example a law requiring cyclists to wear a helmet.  If a 
majority of members of the legislature believe that the law would reduce the incidence of lung cancer 
(obviously a ridiculous belief), under the definitions cited above, the law would not be paternalistic.  
Would that appease the law’s critics?  I think not.  
29 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1734.  
30 Friedman does not explicitly claim that the Spurlock movie is paternalistic.  Perhaps he simply 
offers it as an example of a narrative’s impact.  See id. at 1735 (“The 2004 film Super Size Me told a 
compelling, salient narrative about the harms of fast food through the truthful tale of a thirty-day 
journey of consuming nothing but McDonald’s food offerings.”).  Still, he discusses the film at length 
in sections of his article about “strong-form debiasing,” which he categorizes as a paternalistic level on 
his spectrum.  Id. at 1704–05, 1734–35. 
31 Friedman does not tell us why Spurlock produced the film.  Perhaps Spurlock merely wanted to 
make money or create art.  Maybe he wanted to harm the fast food industry because it had hurt him.  
Although the answer to this question may be irrelevant to telling us whether the movie was powerful, 
truthful, or influential, it is critical to telling us whether it had paternalistic aims.   
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liberty of the subjects it seeks to aid.32  Indeed, even if the film were 
produced and promoted by the government, rather than a private party, it 
would be a stretch to see it as paternalistic, as it still would not limit 
anyone’s liberty.33  That is not to say, of course, that the film might not aim 
to convince people to refrain from doing something for their own good, or 
that it might not be troubling for any number of other reasons.  But unless 
it restricts liberty, it is not, properly speaking, paternalistic.  It follows that 
while there may be many valid and not-so-valid reasons to disapprove of 
the government’s use of strong-form debiasing,34 a critique of paternalism 
is not one of them unless the policy at issue is actually paternalistic.  
Without question, as one moves along Friedman’s spectrum from 
debiasing strategies to insulation strategies to bans and mandates, the 
deprivations of liberty become starker and more apparent.35  Indeed, as I 
will suggest below, Friedman’s spectrum should be viewed more as a 
spectrum of coercion than of degrees of paternalism.36  That still does not 
mean that each and every restriction of liberty undertaken in the name of 
public health is paternalistic.  The discussion of speed limits above offers 
an example of a ban that restricts liberty to prevent injury to others.  
Likewise, a law that bans texting while driving would readily be viewed as 
one that restricts other-regarding behavior, and hence is not paternalistic.37 
                                                                                                                          
32 Friedman suggests that because Spurlock is a private actor, his film could be classified “as a 
market-driven, apaternalistic venture.”  Friedman, supra note 1, at 1704.  Yet, as Friedman observes, 
private actors can also act paternalistically when they limit the liberty of individuals, as parents do 
when they “ground” a child.  See id. at 1695 (noting Dworkin’s “distinction between narrow and broad 
paternalism, with narrow paternalism describing state action, and broad paternalism further including 
private actors”).  It is not the private nature of Spurlock’s film, however, that precludes its classification 
as paternalistic.  It is the fact that the film does not limit liberty.  But see Sunstein, supra note 26, at 
1865–66 (suggesting that efforts to stigmatize a product might be described as a form of private 
paternalism because it imposes psychic costs). 
33 See Pope, supra note 24, at 686–87 (“To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject’s 
liberty. . . . The intended effect in both the direct paternalism and the indirect paternalism examples is 
the same: to prevent individuals from smoking tobacco and harming their health.”). 
34 For example, such tactics may be misleading, ineffective, or a waste of taxpayer funds. 
35 Friedman views conditional mandates (an insulation strategy in his taxonomy) as a restriction 
of autonomy.  See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1750 (describing how the Big Gulp ban in New York City 
was a conditional mandate, one kind of insulation strategy that would have had minimal impact but was 
still considered an “autonomy deprivation”).  As he recognizes, this classification is questionable as the 
subject continues to have considerable autonomy.  For example, a lover of large portions of soft drinks 
could have circumvented New York’s soda ban by buying two beverages rather than one.  Id. at 1738–
39.  Friedman, however, is correct in concluding that the government is setting some restriction on 
autonomy by requiring individuals to make two purchases rather than one to attain the larger portion.  
Id.  Still, it is worth noting that consumers never enter the marketplace with unlimited choices.  Prior to 
the portion cap rule, consumers who wanted to buy small size portions often were unable to do so.  The 
law thus substituted a condition of the marketplace for one of the polity.  In neither case was individual 
freedom absolute, nor could it ever be.   
36 See infra text accompanying notes 58–60. 
37 Sunstein suggests, however, that such a law could be viewed as paternalistic if it sought to 
override individuals’ judgments as to what is good for them, rather than preventing harm to others.  See 
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Often the question of whether a law aims to benefit the subject or 
others is indeterminate, as the law may well be viewed as seeking to 
benefit both the individual whose liberty is limited and others.  The most 
salient recent example of this is the Affordable Care Act’s so-called 
individual mandate.38  Many critics of the law regard it as paternalistic by 
forcing insurance upon individuals who would rather not be insured.39  
Others view it as a form of redistribution that seeks to bring young and 
healthy individuals into the insurance market for the good of older and not-
so-healthy individuals.40 
As the above examples suggest, perspective matters.  Policymakers 
may have one goal and perspective, while those who are regulated may 
have others.  One challenge for those thinking about paternalism and 
public health law is that many laws that seem paternalistic to those being 
regulated may not appear as such to public health advocates and regulators 
who share a population perspective.  As I have argued elsewhere, public 
health adopts a population perspective that prioritizes the good of 
populations qua populations and treats populations not simply as the 
summation of individuals, but as subjects.41  With populations in the 
forefront, this perspective emphasizes the ubiquity of the influence of 
social and environmental factors—the so-called social determinants of 
health—on the health of populations and the individuals within them.42  
From a population perspective, many interventions that appear to be 
paternalistic from an individualistic vantage point do not qualify as such.  
For example, in defending former Mayor Bloomberg’s initiatives against 
obesity, Lawrence Gostin writes, “[P]ersonal choice is always conditioned 
by social circumstances in various ways.  The public health approach 
rejects the idea that there is such a thing as unfettered free will, recognizing 
instead that the built environment, social networks, marketing, and a range 
of situational cues drive complex behaviors.”43  Note that Gostin’s 
                                                                                                                          
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1863 (“My working definition of paternalism does not include government 
efforts to prevent people from harming others . . . . By contrast, the definition includes government 
efforts to override people’s judgments . . . .”).  One possible distinction between a public health and a 
libertarian perspective is how readily one is apt to view such a law as paternalistic or aimed at 
preventing harm to others. 
38 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum health care 
insurance for themselves and their dependents). 
39 E.g., Charles Krauthammer, Obamacare Laid Bare, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2013, at A19; Jim 
Yardley, A Different View of Paternalism, AM. THINKER (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.americanthinker.c
om/2013/11/a_different_view_of_paternalism.html. 
40 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (describing the 
mandate as a way of forcing healthier people into insurance pools to “subsidize” the costs of the 
unhealthy). 
41 WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 19 (2009). 
42 Id. at 16.   
43 Gostin, supra note 16, at 23.  
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statement contains two rejoinders to those critics, such as Friedman, who 
view most anti-obesity initiatives as paternalistic.  First, drawing from 
social epidemiology, but in close company with behavioral economists,44 
Gostin questions whether we can speak intelligently about an “unfettered 
free will” that public health measures restrict.45  If individuals develop 
their preferences and goals only in the context of their social environments 
and within the populations they comprise, the idea of an unfettered 
autonomy denied by public health laws becomes problematic.  Yet as 
suggested above, if a law does not restrict autonomy, its classification as 
paternalistic is problematic; and certainly it cannot be viewed as an 
exercise of hard paternalism.46  
Second, and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, Gostin’s 
approach dissolves the distinction between self-regarding and other-
regarding behavior.  Once we recognize that social networks and 
situational cues influence preferences, we must concede that behaviors that 
initially appear to be self-regarding can have spillover effects that can 
influence others to engage in unhealthy behaviors.47  As a result, laws that 
appear from an individualist perspective to regulate a subject’s behavior 
for his or her own good often appear from a public health perspective to 
regulate behavior for the good of the group.48 
                                                                                                                          
44 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1721, 1727 (explaining how personal autonomy is also limited 
by societal influences and norms, as well as by genetics and personal preferences). 
45 Gostin, supra note 16, at 23.  
46 See Pope, supra note 24, at 687 (“To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject’s 
liberty.”).  This is close, but not identical, to Thaler and Sunstein’s argument that soft paternalism is 
justified because individual preferences are affected by both bounded rationality and what they call 
“choice architecture.”  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT, HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3–6, 255 (2008).  They urge policymakers to use law to 
“nudge” individuals to the choices that they would have made if they were fully informed and fully 
rational.  Id. at 4–6, 255.  But as David Yosifon points out, so-called libertarian paternalists continue to 
assume that authentic individual preferences exist apart from an individual’s social environment.  
David. G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 681, 698–99 (2008) (“The three ‘bounds’ of the behavioral law and economics approach maintain 
the basic dispositional perspective at that heart of the conventional rational actor model.”).  The 
population perspective, by focusing on populations, questions that notion. 
47 See Gostin, supra note 16, at 23 (“[The] harm principle . . . argue[s], for example, that 
secondhand smoke, increased medical costs, and lost productivity amount to harm to others and so are 
not purely self-regarding.  Third-party harms are not imaginary . . . .”); see also Elizabeth Weeks 
Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1335, 1345–49 (2009) (explaining how individual self-regarding actions can negatively affect 
society and others, while public health regulations can simultaneously be paternalistic and seek to 
protect people from themselves and be for the benefit of others); Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New 
Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 261 (2012) (“Measures aimed at altering the social 
environment in ways that influence health behaviors and outcomes are supported by public health 
science . . . .”). 
48 See Gostin & Gostin, supra note 3, at 217 (“[P]ublic health practices are ‘communal in nature, 
and concerned with the well-being of the community as a whole and not just the well-being of any 
particular person.’” (quoting Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public 
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The disjuncture between the individualistic and public health 
perspectives is easy to see in the case of vaccination.  Vaccines are 
sometimes defended as benefiting the health of individuals who are 
vaccinated.49  Public health advocates, in contrast, value vaccinations for 
their ability to establish herd immunity or, in other words, because they 
benefit the group.50 
But even some laws that are widely viewed as paternalistic do not 
always appear as such from a public health perspective.  Consider, for 
example, motorcycle helmet laws, which Friedman presents as an example 
of an insulating law.51  Critics of such laws contend that they aim to protect 
the health of the motorcycle rider they regulate and any attempt to defend 
such laws on the basis of savings to the public health care system is 
disingenuous.52  From a public health perspective, however, helmet laws 
may not serve to save taxpayers money as much as to influence the norms 
of other would-be motorcycle riders who may be more likely to develop a 
preference for wearing helmets if they observe others doing so as well.  In 
this sense, helmet laws act like indoor smoking laws in that they alter the 
norms of the population.53  
My goal here is neither to assert that the above-cited public health laws 
are or are not paternalistic, nor to defend any of these laws from a 
population perspective.  Rather, I simply wish to suggest that the 
relationship between paternalism and public health is far more problematic 
and nuanced than Friedman, and indeed many public health supporters, 
suppose.54  This not only raises questions about Friedman’s assertion that 
                                                                                                                          
Health, in NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 57, 66 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock 
eds., 1999))).  
49 Wendy E. Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 401, 408 (2011). 
50 Id. at 405; see, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Vaccine Is Credited in Steep Fall of HPV Infection in 
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at A1 (describing “herd immunity” in the context of the HPV 
vaccine as a phenomenon wherein “people who are vaccinated reduce the overall prevalence of the 
virus in society, decreasing the chances that unvaccinated people would be exposed to someone who is 
infected”). 
51 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1705–06.   
52 Gostin and Gostin note that such justifications have been criticized as “strained attempts to 
frame paternalism as coming within the harm principle.”  Gostin & Gostin, supra note 3, at 219; see 
also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel 
Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 170 (2005) (citing cases concerning motorcycle helmets for 
the proposition that “[t]he concept of harm to others is subject to limitless expansion”).  
53 An individualist might reply that this is just an indirect form of paternalism, as the public health 
advocates wish to protect everyone in the group from their own poor judgment.  This argument 
disregards the fundamentally different ontological stance between the public health perspective and the 
individualist perspective.  One sees the individual as logically prior to the group; the other views the 
group (or population) as a subject with its own inherent characteristics and worth.   
54 See, e.g., Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public 
Health: Talking Point on Public Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REP. 1099, 1101–02 (2007) 
(arguing for strong “paternalistic restrictions with regard to motorcycle helmets”). 
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paternalism has reached its limits, but also about his typology. 
According to Friedman, his five-level spectrum of interventions 
classifies regulatory tools by the degree to which they rely on soft or hard 
means of paternalism.55  At one end of the spectrum are “softer” 
techniques, which “attempt to address cognitive biases through the 
presentation of more information to improve the quality of decision 
making.”56  At the other end of the spectrum are “outright bans, reflecting 
hard paternalism.”57 
Space here precludes a full discussion of the literature surrounding 
cognitive biases, soft paternalism, and even so-called libertarian 
paternalism.58  What is critical for present purposes is that Friedman’s 
typology assumes a relationship between the degree of coerciveness of a 
law and the softness or hardness of its paternalism.  In effect, Friedman 
classifies policies that are less coercive and leave the subjects with more 
“choice,” i.e., policies that Thaler and Sunstein term “nudges,” or 
examples of “libertarian paternalism,”59 as soft paternalism, and those that 
are more coercive and leave the subject with less choice as exercises of 
hard paternalism.60  This approach seems roughly compatible with that of 
Sunstein, who writes, “[I]t might be best to understand paternalistic 
interventions in terms of a continuum from hardest to softest, with the 
points marked in accordance with the magnitude of the costs (of whatever 
kind) imposed on choosers by choice architects.”61 
Friedman’s association of soft paternalism with a lack of coercion (or 
the maintenance of choice) is not unprecedented.  As Sara Conly notes, 
“The terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ may differentiate between the methods used to 
induce paternalistic actions, where hard paternalism . . . [makes] some 
actions impossible, and soft paternalism merely recommends incentivizing 
                                                                                                                          
55 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698–99.  
56 Id. at 1699.   
57 Id.   
58 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 4–5 (noting that using “the term libertarian to 
modify the word paternalism . . . mean[s] liberty-preserving”). 
59 Id. at 5–6. 
60 Friedman’s placement of different interventions along his spectrum is questionable.  For 
example, Friedman treats New York City’s portion cap rule as a conditional mandate that, in his 
typology, is softer than bans or mandates.  Friedman, supra note 1, at 1705–06.  However, while it is 
possible to categorize the portion cap rule as a conditional mandate, because consumers can continue to 
consume large quantities of soda, it is equally plausible to claim that the portion cap rule was a “ban” 
that barred a particular type of purchase.  Indeed, Friedman uses the term “ban” in conjunction with the 
portion cap rule throughout the article.  On the other hand, Friedman treats regulations of school 
lunches and SNAP purchases as examples of hard paternalism within a zone of control.  Id. at 1744–47.  
Yet these regulations can also be viewed as conditional mandates, since children can consume food not 
sold in school, and SNAP recipients are not prohibited by law (only economics) from using other funds 
to purchase junk food. 
61 Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1859. 
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certain preferable options.”62  But other scholars argue that soft paternalism 
“protects autonomy by ensuring that the subject’s choices reflect her true 
preferences,”63 while hard paternalism “may impose actions the agent 
would not want even if aware of the facts.”64  Under this approach, the key 
characteristic distinguishing hard from soft paternalism is the respect (or 
lack thereof) given to the subject’s own preferences.65  
Each of these different approaches raises distinct questions about 
Friedman’s spectrum.  If respect for the subject’s authentic preferences is 
the key to determining whether an intervention is soft or hard, there is no 
reason a priori for assuming that bans or mandates are necessarily harder 
than debiasing strategies.  After all, a powerful narrative (an advertisement, 
perhaps) can momentarily induce an individual to take an action contrary 
to his or her own “true” preferences and, in that sense, disrespect the 
individual’s autonomous preferences without being highly coercive.  
Conversely, a mandate might propel someone to do what he or she really 
wants to do, but would not do in the absence of compulsion.  It follows that 
some laws that Friedman treats as hard, and which he suggests may be 
more problematic for that reason alone, may actually be—depending on 
the definition of soft paternalism used—softer than laws that rely less on 
compulsion.  On the other hand, if the distinction between hard and soft 
paternalism is based, as Friedman claims, on the degree of coerciveness 
(or, as Sunstein argues, on the cost imposed by a policy),66 then the 
question arises whether paternalism qua paternalism rather than the use of 
coercion has very much to do at all with the reception given to various 
laws.   
In the public health context, the use of coercion in the absence of 
necessity may sometimes be problematic even when it is not paternalistic.  
Thus, quarantines and other coercive communicable-disease-control laws, 
such as mandated tuberculosis treatment and laws requiring the reporting 
of communicable diseases, raise a host of both ethical and public health 
problems even though they are not paternalistic.67  Indeed, lawyers and 
ethicists have long employed concepts such as the least-restrictive 
                                                                                                                          
62 CONLY, supra note 12, at 5. 
63 Pope, supra note 24, at 671–72. 
64 CONLY, supra note 12, at 5.  
65 Pope, supra note 24, at 673–78, 683–84 (defining both soft and hard paternalism). 
66 See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1836, 1859–60 (describing various forms of paternalism as 
alternatively exacting “material,” “psychic,” “large,” or “small” costs).  
67 See Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A 
Return to the Rule of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 370–72, 374–76 (2009) (citing forced treatment, 
patient consent, confidentiality, and Fourth Amendment strictures against search and seizure as ethical 
and legal problems raised by public health programs). 
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alternative,68 proportionality,69 and ladders of intervention70 to argue 
against the application of any more coercion than is necessary to support 
public health—even when the harm prevented is to others rather than to the 
subject being coerced.  Seen in this context, Friedman’s spectrum of 
interventions has less to do with paternalism per se than with well-
established cautions against the excessive use of public health powers. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
So far I have argued that the relationship between public health law, 
coercion, and paternalism is more nuanced than Friedman supposes.  That 
does not mean that he is wrong in claiming that paternalism has reached its 
political limits.  Some public health laws may be widely rejected because 
they are viewed as paternalistic.71  After all, John Stuart Mill’s distinction 
between the use of law to limit self-regarding and other-regarding actions 
remains highly influential.72  Further, as Friedman suggests, the perception 
that many public health laws are paternalistic, and problematic precisely 
for that reason, is widespread in both the popular media and the scholarly 
literature.73  Indeed, paternalism and the nanny state have become common 
tropes in popular discourse. 
Still, there are several reasons to question whether the rejection of 
paternalism, understood as the restriction of someone’s liberty for his or 
her own good, is as central to the problems facing public health law today 
as Friedman and the nanny-state trope suggest.74  For one thing, many laws 
                                                                                                                          
68 See, e.g., In re Washington, 735 N.W.2d 111, 119–21 (Wis. 2007) (discussing a Wisconsin 
statute permitting involuntary confinement of an individual with tuberculosis if “no less restrictive 
alternative exists”). 
69 See, e.g., James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 170, 173 (2002) (explaining proportionality as requiring that “public health benefits outweigh 
the infringed general moral considerations”). 
70 See, e.g., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PUBLIC HEALTH: ETHICAL ISSUES 41–42 (2007), 
available at http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Public-health-ethical-issues.pdf 
(proposing an “intervention ladder” as a way of assessing the appropriateness of public health laws, in 
which laws that are “more intrusive” are higher on the ladder and require a stronger justification). 
71 See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1853 (arguing that paternalistic laws regard people “as children” 
and without “respect”). 
72 See MILL, supra note 25, at 13, 96–97 (introducing and explaining the principle that limitations 
of liberty are warranted only to prevent harm to others).  
73 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1690–91 nn.11–16 (noting a popular-press book and a plethora 
of scholarly articles on paternalism).  Thaddeus Mason Pope has argued that “[p]aternalism is at the 
normative center of increasingly pressing public health questions concerning the permissibility of 
restrictions on the consumption of tobacco products and sugary, fatty foods.”  Pope, supra note 24, at 
660–61. 
74 It is also quite debatable, for reasons explained above, whether the distinctions between the so-
called “new public health,” that tries to protect people from self-regarding activities, and the old public 
health, that supposedly protected people from communal harms, are as stark as many critics of the new 
public health have contended.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 1368 (demonstrating the new public 
health approach through obesity, which is non-communicable and does not necessitate “coercive 
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that are (or are perceived to be) paternalistic remain highly popular.  
Friedman notes, for example, that despite being an example of hard 
paternalism, trans fat bans have encountered little resistance, perhaps 
because they do not appear to impose a significant cost on the population.75  
And while he points to opposition in some localities against fluoridation of 
the water supply as an example of anti-paternalism even where the 
“science appears to be settled,” he also observes that some jurisdictions 
have recently opted to retain fluoridation.76  Given the mixed results, it is 
hard to say that fluoridation has met paternalism’s limits. 
Many other examples of popular public health laws that are often 
viewed as paternalistic can be offered.  For example, the public seems to 
want the FDA to do more to protect it from unsafe foods and drugs.77  
Additionally, although seat belt laws are generally viewed as paternalistic, 
a 2012 Minnesota report shows that they are now widely accepted.78  Even 
helmet laws, though unpopular among many motorcycle riders, have 
widespread support.79  Laws requiring food manufacturers and restaurants 
to reduce sodium are also very popular.80 
 As Friedman shows so well, context and particularities matter.  For 
example, as the growing acceptance of seat belt laws and smoking bans 
illustrates, laws that are controversial when first introduced often become 
                                                                                                                          
collective action”); Hall, supra note 3, at S204–05 (making the same point with fluoridation, but 
concluding that collective action is “much more cost-effective than . . . individual responses”).  For a 
further discussion of the distinctions between the new and old public health, see Burris & Anderson, 
supra note 15, at 108. 
75 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1709, 1750–51. 
76 Id. at 1762.  Opposition to fluoridation, like opposition to vaccination and other public health 
efforts, may be attributable, at least in part, to the fact that as prevention efforts become more 
successful, the need for them becomes less apparent.  See, e.g., Doren D. Frederickson et al., Childhood 
Immunization Refusal: Provider and Parent Perceptions, 36 FAM. MED. 431, 436 (2004) (concluding 
that “non-immunizing parents are aware that their children may be at lower risk if most other children 
. . . are immunized”); Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They Compatible 
When It Comes to Vaccines?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 71, 74 (2005) (noting that the more 
successful vaccination is, the less important it is for individuals).  This relates to the fact that public 
health is a public good that confronts collective-action problems.  Parmet, supra, at 75; Leonard, supra 
note 47, at 1339 (defining public health as an activity that aims at promoting public goods). 
77 See Amanda Gardner, U.S. Public Lacks Confidence in FDA: Poll, HEALTHDAY (Apr.                   
30, 2009), http://consumer.healthday.com/public-health-information-30/food-and-drug-administration-
news-315/u-s-public-lacks-confidence-in-fda-poll-626405.html (noting that about half of the public 
feels that the FDA “isn’t doing enough” to protect the public).  For reasons discussed previously, many 
FDA regulations may not in fact be paternalistic.  See supra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
78 For a recent review of the public’s acceptance of seat-belt laws in Minnesota, see FRANK 
DOUMA & NEBIYOU TILAHUN, CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN RURAL SAFETY, IMPACTS OF MINNESOTA’S 
PRIMARY SEAT BELT LAW 14, 15 (2012), available at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ots/seat-belts-air-
bags/Documents/dps-eval-primary-seat-belt-law.pdf. 
79 Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 89. 
80 Morain & Mello, supra note 15, at 490.  Morain and Mello provide a chart showing that a 
majority of the public supports a wide range of public health interventions aimed at preventing non-
communicable diseases.  Id. 
 1788 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1771 
well-accepted (though not less paternalistic) over time.81  In addition, as 
Friedman’s analysis suggests, paternalistic laws are more likely to be 
accepted when the burdens they place on the public are minimal.82  It also 
seems likely, as Scott Burris and Evan Anderson hypothesize, that the 
public’s intuition about risk and causality affect its support of a public 
health law.83  The public might be quite supportive of a law barring the sale 
of E. coli infested meat both because the disease seems fearsome and the 
law seems well-targeted.  On the other hand, despite widespread 
recognition that obesity is a significant public health problem,84 Americans 
are most likely less afraid of it than of E. coli.  So too, the relationship 
between specific laws aimed at obesity, such as New York City’s soda 
portion cap rule, and the obesity epidemic may appear, to many, to be quite 
attenuated.  Importantly, when it comes to perception, all risks are not 
equal.85 
Nor are all restrictions on liberty equally contentious.  As Peter 
Jacobson has noted, there is an important distinction between paternalistic 
laws that limit fundamental rights and those that restrict lesser liberties.86  
Under our Constitution, and in our political culture, a health regulation that 
limited reproductive autonomy or freedom of worship would be thought of 
quite differently than one that restricted an individual’s “right” to ride a 
motorcycle without a helmet or smoke indoors.  The short reason for this is 
simply that in the latter cases, no legally-recognized “right” is infringed.  
Not all exercises of liberty are rights.87 
                                                                                                                          
81 See DOUMA & TILAHUN, supra note 78, at 14 (showing that a seat belt law gained and 
sustained public approval); Friedman, supra note 1, at 1747 n.340 (citing the proliferation of smoking 
bans and restrictions). 
82 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1747–51 (citing the example of trans fats, the banning of which 
caused little burden or loss of pleasure for consumers, resulting in public acceptance). 
83 Burris & Anderson, supra note 15, at 108. 
84 See PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC AGREES ON OBESITY’S IMPACT, NOT GOVERNMENT’S ROLE: YES 
TO CALORIES ON MENUS, NO TO SODA LIMITS 1 (2013), available at http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/11-12-13%20Obesity%20Release.pdf (noting sixty-three percent of 
Americans think that obesity is a significant problem for society, and not just individuals). 
85 See Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health & Social Controls: Implications for Human Rights 11 
(Northeastern Pub. Law & Theory Faculty Working Papers Series, No. 44-2010, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546654 (suggesting that rare and overtly 
symptomatic diseases are more likely to be feared, and therefore more likely to be addressed by public 
health laws, than commonplace diseases). 
86 Peter D. Jacobson, Changing the Culture of Rights: One Public Health Misstep at a Time, 51 
SOC. SCI. & MOD. SOC. 221, 226–27 (2014). 
87 This raises a crucial point: under well settled constitutional doctrine, state laws that limit 
liberty, but not fundamental rights, receive a presumption of constitutionality, even if they are 
paternalistic and highly coercive.  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) 
(explaining that a challenged state action must implicate a fundamental right before the courts will 
require more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to sustain the law).  In law, if not in 
politics, the onus is on those who challenge such laws, at least under the Constitution.  Challenges 
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In addition, many of the objections that can and are made to 
paternalistic laws are also laid at regulations of other-regarding actions.88  
Although Mill’s harm principle condones restrictions on liberty to prevent 
harm to others, the current anti-regulatory mood in contemporary 
American culture does not only set a limit on paternalistic laws, it also 
undermines support for laws aimed at other-regarding behaviors.89  For 
example, health care workers have been surprisingly resistant to mandates 
requiring them to be vaccinated against the flu, even though such policies 
are aimed at protecting patients, rather than the health care workers 
themselves.90  Public health and safety advocates have also failed in many 
of their attempts to impose new gun controls, even though such laws seek 
to prevent harm to others.91  Indeed, at times it seems as if the public may 
be more willing to accept laws that regulate self-regarding behavior than 
those that restrict other-regarding behavior.  At least public health 
advocates sometimes appear to believe that to be the case, as is evident by 
their attempts to promote vaccines as something that individuals should 
obtain to protect themselves, rather than to protect others.92  Perhaps, then, 
the limits to public health arise less from paternalism than from a 
resistance to regulation in general, one fueled in part by the record low 
levels of trust Americans have in government.93  That lack of trust is a 
problem for public health, but it is not a problem specific to paternalism. 
IV.  BEYOND PATERNALISM:  PUBLIC HEALTH AND SELF-GOVERNANCE 
In 1988, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) famously stated, “Public 
health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for 
people to be healthy.”94  This definition suggests that public health is an 
enterprise that individuals or groups, coming together, do to promote their 
                                                                                                                          
based on a lack of statutory authority, in contrast, raise different issues.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 108–18. 
88 See CONLY, supra note 12, at 115 (suggesting that attacks against paternalism are actually 
arguments against legislation generally). 
89 In this sense, libertarianism as a contemporary political and cultural force has a far lower 
tolerance of regulation than does libertarianism as a political theory. 
90 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, 362 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1949, 1951 (2010) (describing health worker resistance to an H1N1 vaccine mandate). 
91 See Jay Newton-Small, Gun Control Activists Seek to Reboot After Newtown Shooting 
Momentum Fades, TIME (Dec. 13, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/13/gun-control-activists-
seek-to-reboot-after-newtown-shooting-momentum-fades/ (discussing the failure of gun control 
advocates to effectuate change in the wake of Newtown). 
92 See Parmet, supra note 12, at 268–69 (suggesting that vaccine proponents often emphasize the 
benefits to the individual over the benefits to the population as a whole).  
93 See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2013, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Oct. 18, 
2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-interactive/ (finding that only 
nineteen percent of Americans trust the government). 
94 INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1091&page=19.  
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own health.  In this sense, public health legal interventions are not or 
should not be viewed as paternalistic for two reasons.  First, at least in a 
democratic polity, public health laws should not be seen as the edict of a 
disembodied policymaker seeking to benefit an unwilling public.  Rather, 
they should be understood as tools that populations use to benefit 
themselves.  In effect, public health laws are the means by which 
populations achieve their own health ends.95 
Second, and related, public health laws can be viewed not simply as 
limitations of liberty, but also as exercises of positive liberty.  Public health 
laws are both the manifestation of the positive liberty of self-governance96 
and a means by which individuals attempt to enhance their own autonomy 
by reducing the risks they face.97  After all, while there may be freedom in 
not being vaccinated, there is also the freedom that comes from living in a 
community with herd immunity.  Likewise, although indoor smoking laws 
undoubtedly limit some people’s freedom, they also enhance the freedom 
of others who can more easily avoid both the exposure to second-hand 
smoke and the seductions to a habit they might prefer to forgo.  More 
generally, public health laws enhance liberty by freeing people from the 
restrictions imposed by injury and disease.98  
The merits of viewing public health law in this way, as an exercise of 
and enhancement to positive liberty are numerous, and well beyond the 
scope of this Article.  For present purposes, one point especially relevant to 
Friedman’s article warrants consideration.  In his discussion of GMOs, 
Friedman sheds light on how a popular movement can support interference 
in the market in the name of public health.99  In Friedman’s view, “[t]he 
GMO debate fits comfortably into the broader narrative about the limits of 
paternalism in public health,” because legislation is required to protect 
consumers from the “broader, hard paternalism of food producers.”100  
That’s one way of telling the tale, but the same argument can be made 
                                                                                                                          
95 See Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 88 (suggesting that government regulation of public health is 
actually a medium for the public at large to address their own public health policy concerns). 
96 It is important to remember that this is the very reason why most public health laws, 
paternalistic or not, are given the presumption of constitutionality.  See Beatie v. City of New York, 
123 F.3d 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1997) (asserting that “it is up to those who attack [a] law to demonstrate that 
there is no rational connection between the challenged ordinance and the promotion of public health” 
because the “Constitutional presumption in this area of the law is that the democratic process will, in 
time, remedy improvident legislative choices and that judicial intervention is therefore generally 
unwarranted”). 
97 See PARMET, supra note 41, at 116 (“[T]he recognition of a positive right to population health 
necessarily assumes that individuals cannot fulfill all of their goals, which presumably includes being 
healthy, without the assistance or support of others.”). 
98 Jacobson, supra note 86, at 222. 
99 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1763–64.  For reasons discussed above, a law demanding that food 
producers disclose the presence of GMOs is not properly understood as paternalistic.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 25–27. 
100 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1765.  
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about many other public health laws that Friedman treats as 
problematically paternalistic.  Once we recognize that the market limits 
consumers’ liberty (a coercion that is not properly understood as 
paternalistic because it does not aim at benefitting the consumer), then, as 
the advocates of soft paternalism remind us,101 many laws that regulate the 
market in the name of public health can be seen as promoting, rather than 
stifling, liberty. 
So what is different about the GMO example from the other 
purportedly paternalist laws that Friedman reviews?  One possibility is that 
the first clause of the IOM’s definition matters: “Public health is what we” 
do.102  Public health laws that are strongly rooted in, and indeed arise from, 
the public, may face a quite different fate than those that derive from the 
good intentions of public health policymakers alone. 
To be sure, in our complex and often polarized society, it is always 
problematic to proclaim that any particular law is or is not popularly 
rooted.  After all, the views of social movements demanding public health 
protection—consider for example, the movement that developed in 
response to the HIV epidemic—need not be representative of the opinions 
of the majority.103  Similarly, as in the case of enhanced background checks 
for gun purchases, a highly mobilized group may undermine a law’s 
political viability even if the law has broad popular support.104 
Determining a law’s provenance—whether it derived top-down from 
officials or bottom up from popular mobilization—can also be complex.  
As Friedman pointed out in an earlier article, actions instigated by public 
health officials can spark public dialogue,105 which in turn can lead to more 
popularly-rooted laws.  Moreover, popular movements can give birth to 
broad administrative authority, as the genesis of many federal agencies, 
from the FDA to the EPA, suggests.  There is also no doubt that public 
health protection often demands that broad authority be exercised even in 
                                                                                                                          
101 See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1835–36 (identifying “hard” paternalism as highly aggressive 
and “soft” paternalism as weaker, preserving the freedom of choice). 
102 See INST. OF MED., supra note 94, at 19 (emphasis added).  
103 See Gregory M. Herek, Thinking About AIDS and Stigma: A Psychologist’s Perspective, 30 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 594, 596 (2002) (“[P]ublic opinion surveys conducted in the early years of the 
epidemic revealed widespread fear of AIDS, lack of accurate information about its transmission, and 
willingness to support draconian public policies that would restrict civil liberties in the name of fighting 
the disease.”); Joan Beck, AIDS Activists Shake Up the Medical Establishment, BALT. SUN (Jan. 14, 
1992), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-01-14/news/1992014058_1_aids-activists-spent-on-aids-
research (“AIDS activists have pressured research into unprecedented urgency and concentration with 
their demands[] . . . [and] have insisted on and gotten far more than a fair share of money for research 
and care.”). 
104 Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Background Checks, CNN (Apr. 17, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/senate-guns-vote/. 
105 See David Adam Friedman, Micropaternalism, 88 TUL. L. REV. 75, 108–09 (2013) (explaining 
that micropaternalistic laws can “spark public dialogue in a way that can influence the broader 
picture”).   
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the absence of a popular movement—consider the need for officials to 
respond quickly to a pandemic or new type of injurious product.106  The 
public may balk when public health agencies act without its support, but it 
also hollers when officials fail to act in the face of a new threat.  
Despite these complexities, if public health’s limitations on liberty are 
justified because public health constitutes an exercise of self-governance, 
the public rooting of public health laws remains important.107  
Unfortunately, it is hard to view many contemporary public health laws as 
exercises of popular will.  Given the popular outcry against New York 
City’s portion cap rule, it seems specious to view that regulation as 
anything other than an edict imposed by public authorities over the 
opposition of the public and their elected representatives.  Importantly, it 
was this very lack of approval by elected officials that the New York Court 
of Appeals found to be decisive in striking down the regulation.108  In other 
words, the soda portion cap rule was struck down not because it was 
paternalistic and violated the harm principle, but because “it is the province 
of the people’s elected representatives rather than appointed 
administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices 
among competing ends.”109  
A recent case from Ohio provides an interesting contrast.  In City of 
Cleveland v. State,110 an Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a state law 
                                                                                                                          
106 Importantly, I am not arguing that a public health law is only legal if it is rooted in popular 
sovereignty.  Nor am I saying that popular sovereignty is the only justification for a public health law.  
My argument instead is limited to the point that popular sovereignty matters to the political limits of 
public health laws, and that its absence, rather than paternalism, may help to explain the problems 
public health law is facing.  
107 See Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 91(“[W]e suggest utilizing the language of the democratic 
process. . . . The goal of public health is collective problem solving, not authoritarianism.”).  As noted, 
this is not to say that all public health laws need be popularly rooted; rather, this is an important factor 
to the extent that the coercion exercised by public health laws is justified as an exercise of popular 
sovereignty. 
108 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 700 (2014) (finding that the Board of Health exceeded its authority by 
making a policy choice rather than a means to an end chosen by the legislature).  The court did find 
important the fact that, in its view, the regulation limited autonomy.  According to the court, the 
restriction on autonomy was a factor to be considered in deciding whether the board had exceeded its 
authority in acting without legislative guidance.  Id. at 699.  The court never suggested, however, that 
the limitation on autonomy would have been problematic if it had come from the legislature rather than 
the board.  Rather, the problem with the portion cap rule, as the court saw it, was the fact that the board 
imposed a limitation on autonomy in the absence of legislative approval.  Id.  For a defense of the 
legality of the portion cap rule, see Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverage Portion Cap Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 
46 CONN. L. REV. 807 (2013). 
109 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 23 N.Y.3d at 697 (quoting Boreali 
v. Axelrod, 72 N.Y.2d 1, 13 (1987)). 
110 989 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
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forbidding cities from banning trans fats,111 which was enacted in response 
to a Cleveland city council ban.112  In striking down the state law, the court 
relied on the state constitution’s protection for home rule,113 noting that 
localities had the right to enact laws to protect the health of their 
populations and that the state could not preempt the exercise of that right in 
the absence of a comprehensive state public health law.114  In short, 
although Cleveland’s trans fat ban represented a harder flavor of 
paternalism in Friedman’s terms than New York City’s portion cap rule, 
the Cleveland ordinance was viewed by the Ohio court as an exercise of 
popular sovereignty, something that the New York court could not say 
about the New York City portion cap rule.115  
This distinction between critiquing a public health intervention on the 
basis of paternalism rather than on the basis of its legal provenance may be 
a subtle one, but it raises some significant questions about Friedman’s 
analysis, as well as the future course of public health law.116  Most 
particularly, it raises the question of whether the limits that public health 
law is facing derive from a rejection of paternalism qua paternalism or 
from a distancing of public health policymakers from the public they 
serve.117  Has the public come to reject limitations on self-regarding 
behaviors, or has it come to feel that public health officials are no longer 
responsive to its concerns? 
Friedman clearly believes that the problem is paternalism’s limitations 
on autonomy, rather than the top-down nature of public health law today.  
Assuming that the public’s skepticism of paternalism thwarts efforts that 
he believes are necessary for public health protection, Friedman offers 
policymakers (i.e., experts) a detailed and context-specific guide as to how 
they can nevertheless achieve their goals.  Chief among the advice he 
offers is to go soft, be practical, and “identify a mix of initiatives that 
                                                                                                                          
111 Id. at 1076. 
112 Id. at 1075–76, 1085. 
113 OHIO CONST. art. X, § 1. 
114 City of Cleveland, 989 N.E.2d at 1078–79, 1082. 
115 Friedman gives a quite different, but not incompatible, argument as to why trans fat bans have 
been successful despite the hardness of their paternalism.  See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1750 (noting 
that New York City’s hard paternalism trans fat ban “proved less tangible [than the portion cap rule], 
possibly because consumers did not notice that [trans fats were] missing” and, thus, “did not taste a 
loss of autonomy”). 
116 The discussion below argues that questions surrounding the legitimacy of the administrative 
state form one of the limits of public health law.  This is not to say, however, that there are not 
important reasons why public health law relies on administration.  I hope to review and reconcile these 
claims in a subsequent article. 
117 I recognize that the two critiques are related.  A distrust of expertise may underline a 
disapproval of paternalism.  But as I have suggested, the two critiques are not the same, and one can 
disapprove of expertise even in the absence of paternalism.  Conversely, one can approve of 
paternalism as an exercise of self-governance while rejecting expertise. 
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combine efficacy with practicality.”118  
However, if the rejection of the nanny state is based more on public 
health officials’ willingness to intervene in the absence of popular support 
than on disapproval of paternalism itself, efforts such as those by Friedman 
to inform policymakers about the tools they should employ may backfire.  
Indeed, if public health is facing a backlash based on its own over-reliance 
on expertise and administrative authority, efforts to inform policymakers 
about how to hide their paternalism—or exercise it softly—risk offering 
policymakers the false assurance that they can promote public health 
without first seeking the public’s active trust and engagement. 
To gain that trust and engagement—to ensure that public health laws 
are indeed the laws that “we the people” establish to protect us—public 
health advocates need to rethink how they speak and, more importantly, 
how they listen to the populations they serve.119  This requires a renewed 
respect for the public’s priorities and concerns, as well as a deep awareness 
of the limits of public health officials’ own authority.120  It also may 
require a new humility about the scope of public health powers.  With this, 
I suspect Friedman would agree, as in his conclusion he wisely reminds 
policymakers of the need to be “attuned to public sentiment.”121  In a 
democracy, after all, the public’s views set the true limits to public health 
law. 
                                                                                                                          
118 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1770.  
119 See Morain & Mello, supra note 15, at 494 (“Our data suggest that the public’s conception of 
fairness may have less to do with how particular decisions are made than with more general 
considerations of access to the decision-making process and faith that decision makers know their 
constituents well enough to carry out their will.”); Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 91 (advocating the 
benefit of communities collaborating on issues of public health). 
120 For more than a decade, many public health law scholars have emphasized the breadth of 
public health powers.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 92, 98 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the “pervasive” nature of state police powers that can be 
used to further the public health, and stating that the “federal government possesses considerable 
authority to act and exerts extensive control in the realm of public health and safety”).  
121 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1769.  
